Patchfirst
CVE-2020-15105 Medium · 5.4 EPSS 0.7%

In Django Two-Factor Authentication, user passwords are stored in clear text in the Django session

Bouke · django-two-factor-auth

Official description · CVE.org

Django Two-Factor Authentication before 1.12, stores the user's password in clear text in the user session (base64-encoded). The password is stored in the session when the user submits their username and password, and is removed once they complete authentication by entering a two-factor authentication code. This means that the password is stored in clear text in the session for an arbitrary amount of time, and potentially forever if the user begins the login process by entering their username and password and then leaves before entering their two-factor authentication code. The severity of this issue depends on which type of session storage you have configured: in the worst case, if you're using Django's default database session storage, then users' passwords are stored in clear text in your database. In the best case, if you're using Django's signed cookie session, then users' passwords are only stored in clear text within their browser's cookie store. In the common case of using Django's cache session store, the users' passwords are stored in clear text in whatever cache storage you have configured (typically Memcached or Redis). This has been fixed in 1.12. After upgrading, users should be sure to delete any clear text passwords that have been stored. For example, if you're using the database session backend, you'll likely want to delete any session record from the database and purge that data from any database backups or replicas. In addition, affected organizations who have suffered a database breach while using an affected version should inform their users that their clear text passwords have been compromised. All organizations should encourage users whose passwords were insecurely stored to change these passwords on any sites where they were used. As a workaround, wwitching Django's session storage to use signed cookies instead of the database or cache lessens the impact of this issue, but should not be done without a thorough understanding of the security tradeoffs of using signed cookies rather than a server-side session storage. There is no way to fully mitigate the issue without upgrading.

Breakdown
14.4 / 100
Exploited
Not confirmed
Reports
0
Tactics
5/15

How an attack unfolds

Based on mappings. Select a step to see the evidence.
  1. What they do

  2. What can follow

Disclosed on 10 Jul 2020. No public exploit code or confirmed exploitation is recorded.

techniques

2 , grouped by in kill-chain order 2

Initial AccessTA0001

Valid Accounts T1078 also Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Stealth
MITRE CTID mapping of the CVE · follow-on activity

Credential AccessTA0006

MITRE CTID mapping of the CVE · primary impact

Detection

0 rules for this CVE · 69 general rules for its techniques

Rules for this CVE

0 that reference CVE-2020-15105 directly.

CVE-specific rules are not available in this build. Search SigmaHQ ↗

Sigma rules © SigmaHQ, Detection Rule License 1.1; linked, not reproduced.

Am I affected? What do I upgrade to?

From GitHub Security Advisories and OSV

1 package in 1 ecosystem. Main package: django-two-factor-auth.

PyPIdjango-two-factor-authGHSA-vhr6-pvjm-9qwfPYSEC-2020-39

Upgrade to 1.12 or later

pippip install "django-two-factor-auth>=1.12"

The first fix for CVE-2020-15105. No other CVE tracked by Patchfirst affects this package.

Affected versions

If you runUpgrade to
All versions before 1.121.12

“Up to” means the second version is the fix and is not affected.

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What security researchers reported

Not named in any threat report yet

References

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