IGEL OS Use of a Key Past its Expiration Date Vulnerability
IGEL · IGEL OS
The flaw lies in the igel-flash-driver module of IGEL OS before version 11, where a cryptographic signature is improperly verified, allowing Secure Boot to be bypassed. An attacker with physical access to the device and no authentication or user interaction required can mount a crafted root filesystem from an unverified SquashFS image, which can result in a high impact to availability.
In IGEL OS before 11, Secure Boot can be bypassed because the igel-flash-driver module improperly verifies a cryptographic signature. Ultimately, a crafted root filesystem can be mounted from an unverified SquashFS image.
- Exploited
- Yes, in CISA KEV
- Reports
- 0
- Tactics
- 2/15
How an attack unfolds
Based on MITRE ATT&CKA public catalogue of the techniques attackers use, maintained by MITRE. Patchfirst uses it to describe what attackers do with a vulnerability. mappings. Select a step to see the evidence.How attackers get in
What they do
Exploitation timelineDated milestones for a CVE: when it was disclosed, when exploit code became public, when exploitation was confirmed, and when threat reports named it.
First seen exploited 4 months after disclosure. Public exploit code (PoC-in-GitHub) was available 16 days before disclosure.
- Public exploit codePoC-in-GitHub16 days before
- Disclosedday 0
CISA KEV listing is when exploitation was confirmed, not necessarily the first attack.
MITRE ATT&CKA public catalogue of the techniques attackers use, maintained by MITRE. Patchfirst uses it to describe what attackers do with a vulnerability. techniques
2 TechniqueOne specific attacker behaviour in MITRE ATT&CK, such as T1190 “Exploit Public-Facing Application”. IDs with a dot, like T1059.004, are sub-techniques., grouped by TacticThe attacker’s goal at a stage of an attack in MITRE ATT&CK, such as Initial Access or Persistence. Each technique belongs to one or more tactics. in kill-chain order, 2 cited passages 2PersistenceTA0003
Physical boot-chain tampering bypasses Secure Boot
Secure Boot can be bypassed because the igel-flash-driver module improperly verifies a cryptographic signature
Malicious system image loaded during boot
a crafted root filesystem can be mounted from an unverified SquashFS image
Detection
0 rules for this CVE · 2 general rules for its techniquesRules for this CVE
0Sigma ruleAn open, vendor-neutral detection rule for log data. Security teams convert Sigma rules into searches for their own SIEM. that reference CVE-2025-47827 directly.CVE-specific rules are not available in this build. Search SigmaHQ ↗
General rules for this CVE’s techniques
These detect the technique in general, not this specific vulnerability.
System FirmwareT1542.0012 general rules
Sigma rules © SigmaHQ, Detection Rule License 1.1; linked, not reproduced.
What security researchers reported
Not named in any threat report yetAlso mentioned in 50 community threat pulses (AlienVault OTX)
Weaker evidencePulses are indicator collections that anyone can publish. A mention is not confirmation of exploitation.
- Actively_Exploited_Kev | Oct 30, 202629 Oct 2026
- Actively_Exploited_Kev | Oct 29, 202628 Oct 2026
- Actively_Exploited_Kev | Oct 28, 202627 Oct 2026
- Actively_Exploited_Kev | Oct 27, 202626 Oct 2026
- Actively_Exploited_Kev | Oct 24, 202623 Oct 2026
- Actively_Exploited_Kev | Oct 23, 202622 Oct 2026
- 44 more on OTX