xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb frags
Linux · Linux
The flaw is in the Linux kernel's IPv4/IPv6 UDP datagram append paths, which fail to mark pipe pages spliced into skbs as shared, so the ESP input code (used for ESP-in-UDP) can decrypt in place over memory the skb does not own privately. An attacker with local access and low privileges can exploit this, with no user interaction required, to write over data they should not be able to modify, affecting confidentiality, integrity and availability of the system.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb frags MSG_SPLICE_PAGES can attach pages from a pipe directly to an skb. TCP marks such skbs with SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG after skb_splice_from_iter(), so later paths that may modify packet data can first make a private copy. The IPv4/IPv6 datagram append paths did not set this flag when splicing pages into UDP skbs. That leaves an ESP-in-UDP packet made from shared pipe pages looking like an ordinary uncloned nonlinear skb. ESP input then takes the no-COW fast path for uncloned skbs without a frag_list and decrypts in place over data that is not owned privately by the skb. Mark IPv4/IPv6 datagram splice frags with SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG, matching TCP. Also make ESP input fall back to skb_cow_data() when the flag is present, so ESP does not decrypt externally backed frags in place. Private nonlinear skb frags still use the existing fast path. This intentionally does not change ESP output. In esp_output_head(), the path that appends the ESP trailer to existing skb tailroom without calling skb_cow_data() is not reachable for nonlinear skbs: skb_tailroom() returns zero when skb->data_len is nonzero, while ESP tailen is positive. Thus ESP output will either use the separate destination-frag path or fall back to skb_cow_data().
- Exploited
- Yes, in VulnCheck KEV
- Reports
- 0
- Tactics
- 0/15
Exploitation timelineDated milestones for a CVE: when it was disclosed, when exploit code became public, when exploitation was confirmed, and when threat reports named it.
First seen exploited the day it was disclosed. Public exploit code (PoC-in-GitHub) was available the same day.
MITRE ATT&CKA public catalogue of the techniques attackers use, maintained by MITRE. Patchfirst uses it to describe what attackers do with a vulnerability. techniques
No techniques linkedNo ATT&CK techniques are linked to this CVE yet. MITRE CTID has not mapped it, and no report passage in the corpus ties it to a technique.
What security researchers reported
Not named in any threat report yetAlso mentioned in 16 community threat pulses (AlienVault OTX)
Weaker evidencePulses are indicator collections that anyone can publish. A mention is not confirmation of exploitation.
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